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FRANx

R. STRONG*

In an earlier issue of the present volume of the Review, ** an
effort was made to dispel the seeming absurdity that "Separation of
Powers, the cardinal principle upon which the federal and all state
governments are founded, a great American contribution to the
science of government, violates the due process clausel" The quotation is from an able and exhaustive article on Judicial Review of
Administrative Action in West Virginia, written by Kenneth Gulp
Davis at the beginning of a teaching and writing career which has
brought him preminence in the field of Administrative Law. The
article appeared in Volume 44 of this Law Review.
There is yet another paradox which has been of equal perplexity
for Professor Davis and other scholars in the field of administrative
law. This paradox is the seeming inconsistency in judicial views,
especially on the part of the Supreme Court of the United States,
regarding the degree of finality to be accorded administrative
findings of fact. In many situations the courts allow the administrative finding of fact to stand if supported by substantial evidence;
yet in other instances, and arguably for no good reason, courts
demand an independent judicial judgment on the facts or even a
judicial trial de novo. For this confusion Professor Davis in his
article faulted "an abstraction known as the doctrine of separation
of powers,"" concluding a hundred pages later that "Due process and other provisions of the bill of rights constitute adequate
safeguards against arbitrary action; the theory of separation of
powers is not a satisfactory tool to use for this purpose.""7 Although
*Professor of Law, University of North Carolina; Dean and Professor
of Law
0 0 Emeritus, The Ohio State University.
69 W VA. L. REv. 111 (1967).
66
Davis, supra note 1, at 272.
67
Id.at 375.
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the use, or misuse, of the doctrine
as Professor Davis showed for this
paradoxical judicial behavior must
tween two different judicial acts,
is known as judicial review. 8

[Vol. 69

has been a contributing factor,
State, a full explanation of this
be found by distinguishing beeach of which, unfortunately,

II. JuDimC&L REVIEw oF CoNsirUToNAInr DxsTnusimm FmoM
JuDiCIAL REviw UrnmE SFPAnATioN OF PowEts

One type of judicial act which goes by the name of judicial review,
especially in the field of administrative law, consists of judicial reconsideration of legislative and executive action, as it bears upon a
given individual, before governmental sanction (whether civil,
administrative or criminal) becomes final as to that person. Familiar
aspects of this behavior are statutory interpretation, fact finding,
and application of the intended governing rule to the specific facts
as found. Altogether different is judicial review in the sense of court
review of the constitutionality of governmental acts. This is the
form of judicial review the two dimensions of which were examined
in the first Lecture.
While now by no means indigenous to the United States, this
second kind of judicial review is not a feature of all legal systems. 9
It ought to be rechristened constitutional judicial review to distinguish it from the first type, which has nothing to do with
enforcement of constitutional limitations. Little need be said regarding constitutional judicial review save to restress the distinction
68 The difficulty is not just one of terminology' in the literature of administrative law and constitutional law, there is litfe differentiation between
the two basically different types of judicial act. An illustration is the
ambitions effort to evolve standards for "judicial review" made by Hyman
and Newhouse, Standards for Preferred Freedoms, 60 N.W. U. L. Bsv. 1
(1965). An exception is VANDERBILT, SEPARATION OF PoWns 98 (1953).
Employing the terms of differentiation proposed in the text, it is a valid
generalization to say that in the literature of constitutional law "judicial
review" connotes, almost without exception, constitutional judicial review,
whereas in American administrative law writings "judicial review" refers
interchangably to ordinary judicial review and constitutional judicial review.
English writers appear to be more careful. WADE, ADMiNisTRATvE LAW
chap. 3 (1961); Gelinas, Judicial Control of Administration Action: Great
Britain and Canada, 1963 PuB. LAw J. 140.
69 Kadish, supra note 23, is a most informative comparison of constitutional judicial review as practiced by the High Court of Australia and the
Supreme Court of the United States. The current extent of judicial review
of constitutionality in European countries is sketched by Cappelletti and
Adams, Judicial Review of Legislation: European Antecedents and Adaptations, 79 HARv. L. REv. 1207 (1966).
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taken in the earlier Lecture between constitutional judicial review of
direct limitations and constitutional judicial review of indirect
limitations. By contrast, the first type of judicial review is common
to most legal systems; differences obtain among countries only in
respect to the degree to which exceptions to such review are accepted practice. In a very real sense, the term "judicial review" is
descriptively correct for this form of judicial operation: the judicial
action comes in time after relevant legislative and executive action
and, historically at least, functions as a review of, and brake upon,
the action of one or both of the other branches. But in order to
differentiate it from constitutional judicial review let it be called
ordinary judicial review in recognition of its commonness among
the world's legal systems.
Ordinary judicial review is the judicial function which Locke
embyronically identified and to which Montesquieu gave status. In
English law the great decisions vouchsafing to the courts this type
of judicial power are those of Dr. Bonham's Case"0 (1610) and Prohibitions Del Roy7 ' (1612). Both were by Sir Edward Coke.72 It
was in Dr. Bonham's Case, by far the better known of the two, that
Coke made his celebrated statement that "it appears in our books,
that in many cases, the common law will control Acts of Parliament,
and sometimes adjudge them to be utterly void; for when an Act of
Parliament is against common right and reason, or repugnant, or
impossible to be performed, the common law will control it, and
adjudge such Act to be void." 3 Although this assertion has often
been claimed, by scholar and advocate, " to be the forerunner of
constitutional judicial review, it is more soundly viewed as judicial
assertion of the power to interpret legislation. 5 Dr. Bonhairms Case
70 8 Co. 114a, 77 Eng. Rep. 647
71 12 Co. 63, 77 Eng. Rep. 1342

(1610).

(1612).
Jaffe, The Right to Judicial Review I, 71 HAnv. L. Rv. 401, 412-414
(1958), credits Dr. Bonham's Case and Coke's decision in James Bagg's
Case, 11 Co. 93b, 77 Eng. Rep. 1271 (1615), with laying the English groundwork for a common law of judicial review. No mention is made of Prohibitions Del Roy.
738 Co. 118a, 77 Eng. Rep. 652 (1610).
7
4E. g. James Otis in Paxton's Case, Quincy's Rep. 51, Appendix (Mass.
1761); Corwin Establishment of Judicial Review, 9 MicH. L. REv. 102(1910);
Plucknett, Bonham's Case and Judicial Review, 40 HAav. L. REv. 30 (1926);
Smith, Dr. Bonhams Case and the Modern Significance of Lord Coke's Influence, 41 WASH L. REv . 297 (1966).
75 1 BL. CoMM. 91 (1765); Boudin, Lord Coke and the American Doctrine of judicial Power, 6 N.Y. U. L. REv. 223, 236-246 (1929); Thome, The
Constitution and the Courts: A Reexamination of the Famous Case of Dr.
Bonham, in READ, Tm CoNsvrrtrroN RECONSIDERED 15 (1938).
72
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is no less significant by reason of its classification as an assertion of
court power to engage in ordinary judicial review. For to quote
once again Bishop Hoadlys penetrating observation, "whoever hath
an absolute authority to interpret any written or spoken laws, it is
he who is truly the Law-giver to all intents7 and purposes, and not
the person who first wrote or spoke them."
In ProhibitionsDel Roy, just two years later, the issue was the
issuance of writs of prohibition by the common law courts in their
jurisdictional struggle with the ecclesiastical courts. On plea of the
Archbishop of Canterbury, James I summoned him and Coke
to Whitehall on a Sunday. Bancrof the Archbishop, found it
"clear in divinity" that the King has authority "by the word of God
in the Scripture" to decide "in his Royal person" cases of contested
jurisdiction. Coke, however, reporting the occasion, claims he
challenged this thesis, asserting "that the King in his own person
cannot adjudge any case, either criminal, as treason, felony, etc., or
betwixt party and party, concerning his inheritance, chattels, goods,
etc., but this ought to be determined and adjudged in some Court
of Justice, according to the law and custom of England." To this
James is said to have answered "that he thought the law was founded
upon reason, and that he and others had reason, as well as the
Judges." By way of reply Coke asserts that he conceded "that God
had endowed His Majesty with excellent science, and great endowments of nature; but His Majesty was not learned in the laws of
his realm of England, and causes which concern the life, or inheritance, or goods, or fortunes of his subjects, are not to be decided
by natural reason but by the artificial reason and judgment of
law, which law is an act which requires long study and experience,
before that a man can attain to the cognizance of it." Greatly
offended, the King asserted that it was "treason to affirm" that
"he should be under the law" and it may well be that Coke would
right then have been on his way to the Tower of London had not
his Uncle, the King's treasurer and favorite, interceded on behalf
7
of Coke who contributed his part by getting down "on all fowers". 7
But, if we can believe Coke, this celebrated encounter ended with
Coke countering the King's assertion by quoting Bracton to the
7

AND SoURCES OF = LAW 125 (2d ed. 1924).
Included in Catherine Drinker Bowens magnificent volume on Sir
Edward Coke is an account of the confrontation between James and Coke
which varies in colorful particulars from Coke's own version. BowEN, Tim
LION AND THE THRONE 301-306 (1956).
6 GRAY, NATrUR

77
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effect that "quod Rex non debet esse sub homine, sed sub Deo et
lege." 8
Correctly understood, ordinary judicial review is, both historically
and functionally, a part of constitutional law; it constitutes the
original manner in which courts asserted their authority to participate in limitation of governmental power. In the largely disregarded
or misunderstood final paragraph of Number 78 of the Federalist
Papers, Hamilton explained its great significance:
But it is not with a view to infractions of the Constitution
only, that the independence of the Judges may be an
essential safeguard against the effects of occasional ill
humors in the society. These sometimes extend no farther
than to the injury of the private rights of particular classes
of citizens, by unjust and partial laws. Here also the
firmness of the Judicial magistracy is of vast importance in
mitigating the severity, and confining the operation of such
laws. It not only serves to moderate the immediate mischiefs of those which may have been passed, but it operates
as a check upon the Legislative body in passing them ...
This is a circumstance calculated to have more influence
upon the character of our Governments, than but few may
be aware of. 9
78 Quotations are from 12 Co. at 63-65, 77 Eng. Rep. at 1342-1343.

79The passing years have produced growing awareness of the power
which the exercise of ordinary judicial review gives courts for tempering the
thrust of the other departments of government. From a considerable literature
may be cited Cohen, The Process of Judicial Legislation, 48 Am. L. RInv. 161
(1914); JAcKSON, THE STRucar FOR JUDICIAL SupmiAycY 57-62, 139-141
(1941). A revealing contemporary decision is that of Sherman v. Immigration
and Naturalization Service, 350 F. 2d 894 (C. A. 2d, 1965-1966), remanded,
385 U.S. 276 (1966). On review of an administrative determination of deportability by INS, the majority of a three-judge panel read the pertinent sections of
the applicable statute as directed solely to the scope of ordinary judicial
review to be accorded in deportation proceedings and irrelevant on the
issue of burden of proof. The statute put to one side, the panel insisted
that for aliens of long United States residency the burden of proof ought to
be as heavy as that in the prosecution in criminal cases. "All we can require
is that the special inquiry officer and the Board conscientiously ask whether
the facts on which the deportation of a long-term resident alien depends are
almost certainly true." 350 F.2d. at 899, Professor Jaffe hailed the decision
of the panel in Comment, 79 HARv. L. REv. 914 (1966), although conceding
that "there is some difficulty in meshing a heavy burden of persuasion with
a limited scope of review." Id. at 916. Meantime, however, the panel decision had been reconsidered and reversed by the Second Circuit on rehearing
en bane, the majority of the full Bench adopting the views of the dissenting
panelist. All opinions are set forth in the bound volume of the Federal
Reporter under the citation above given. The Supreme Court in effect
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It is this authority to exercise ordinary judicial review that the
doctrine of separation of powers sought to vouchsafe to the
judiciary."0 This is the significance of the case of Bayard v.
Singleton and of Louis Boudin's favorable reaction thereto, discussed
in the first lecture."1 One may instance as a further illustration the
incorporation in the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 of Article
XXIX, calling for independence of the judiciary, immediately
preceding the oft-quoted Article XXX, which articulated the principle of separation of powers
"to the end it may be a government
82
of laws and not of men."
Strictly applied, the American concept of separated powers8
would prevent finality of administrative decision, whether of fact
or law. Finality of decision is the very hallmark of judicial action,
reversed, two Justices dissenting, by reinstating the interpretation of the
panel. The litigation discloses the potentialities of ordinary judicial review
for the tempering of legislative harshness in a sensitive area of policy.
Shades of Blackstone's Rule 10, a classic articulation of the nature of ordinary
judicial review, are to be seen in Professor Jaffe's further comment, id. at
917; "If the statute is to be interpreted in its very evident spirit of Draconian
severity, the court's interpretation is not easy to come by. But it is, I take it,
a dominant principle of the Supreme Court today that the merely implicit
elements of a statute will not be given effect if the consequences to the individual are in the Court's opinion harsh and unfair." The citation to Rule
10 in the Commentariesappears supra note 75.
80Despite the clear historical grounding of ordinary judicial review
in the concept of separation of powers, some courts and commentators have
difficulty with its constitutional basis. Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit
the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts, 66 HAv. L. REv. 1362, 1375 (1953),
finds "the constitutional right to access to courts" in the Due Process and
Habeas Corpus Clauses. Jaffe, The Right to Judicial Review II,71 HAnv.
L. REv. 769, 795-814 (1958), regards due process and separation-of-powers
as alternative bases of ordinary judicial review. Cited id. at 796-798 are cases
using not only these bases but two others. Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness
and Judicial Review, 65 COL. L. REv. 55, 88-89 (1965), finds the bases of
a right to review in due process, implications from delegation of powers,
and the creation of courts. American constitutional law and theory bear
evidence of close interplay between the concepts of due process and separated powers. STRONG, AMmucA CONsrTronONAL LAw 138-139 (1950).
But it is as odd as it is unnecessary to look to due process for vindication of
ordinary judicial review. For this requires that courts claim the power of
constitutional judicial review in order to justify their older, far more accepted
practice of ordinary judicial review. The doctrine of separation-of-powers
adequately provides the predicate for ordinary judicial review, leaving for
another day and theory the explanation of constitutional judicial review.
81 The discussion appears supra, at page 119.
82

3

THORPE, AMERICAN CnARTErs, CONsTrrTIONS, AND ORGANIC LAWS

1893 (1909).
83 The French concept of separation is very different from, and the
English understanding somewhat at variance with, the American. Dowd,

The Courts as a Restraint on Administrative Power: A Comparative Study in

Constitutional Theory, 40 U. DET. L. J. 597 (1963).
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the end product of the operation of governmental machinery."'
Some State courts attempt to continue adherence to the strict view,
but largely they have beat a retreat by redefining the judicial
function in such a way as to exclude much of the decision-making
engaged in by administrative bodies. A classic illustration is the
advisory opinion of the mid-thirties given by the supreme court of
New Hampshire in response to a request of the State's Senate for
advice on the constitutionality of a proposed "Act Relating to Compensation for Motor Vehicle Accidents."85 This early proposal for
solution of the growing problem of compensation for injury and
death by motor vehicle looked to the use of an administrative base
while retaining negligence as the predicate of liability. 6 The nub
of the court's reasoning in declaring the proposal unconstitutional
is contained in the following paragraph of the opinion:"
In the connection between the departments some overlapping is permissible, and there is a region of authority,
alternative and concurrent, the boundaries of which are
fixed by no final rule. As a rule which meets most situations, when an executive board has regulatory functions,
it may hear and determine controversies which are incidental thereto, but if the duty is primarily to decide questions of legal right between private parties, the function belongs to the judiciary. Courts of justice, in their popular
sense, may not be set up and established in the executive
organization. They pertain exclusively to the branch of the
judiciary."8
The Supreme Court of the United States has in general yielded to
federal administrative bodies, on the point of finality, with sur8

4 Gordon v. United States, 117 U.S. 697 (1864) emphasized this consideration by way of defining the judicial power as forbidding any mitigation
of a judicial decision by subsequent act of any other branch of government.
85 Opinion of the Justices, 87 N.H. 492, 179 AtI. 344 (1935).
86 The Bill is reprinted in 110 A.L.R. 820-825. Compare the current
proposal of Professors Keeton and O'Connell, Basic Protection-A Proposal for
Improving the Automobile Claims System, 78 HAv. L. REv. 329 (1964);
since expanded to a volume KEETON AND O'Co NNL, BASIC PROTEMcON FOR
THE TPAic Vicrim (1965).
8787 N. H. at 493, 179 Ad. at 345.
88 The classic studies of court retreat but not surrender on the front of
ordinary judicial review are those of Pillsbury, Administrative Tribunals, 36
HAav. L. REv. 405 (1923); Brown, Administrative Commissions and the
Judicial Power, 19 MmNN. L. REv. 261 (1935).
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prising ease. Today the acknowledged authority on American
administrative law, Professor Davis has observed that
The Supreme Court of the United States has never held
that judicial power has been improperly vested in an
agency, although the question has come up in cases involving aliens, unreasonable obstructions to navigation,
the Selective Draft Law of the First World War, fixing
allowances in a reorganization, and statutory interpretation in railroad regulation and in coal price-fixing. 9
The Court's retreat first appeared with reference to fact determinations. Presumably, this was in deference to the supposed
expertise of administrative bodies once described by Holmes as
"appointed by law and informed by experience." Yet the retreat
is not complete, the general federal rule being that administrative
determinations of fact are final only if supported by substantial
evidence.9" The Court appears to find constitutional salve in the
retention of some reviewing power; a number of state courts have
reasoned thusly although the New Hampshire supreme court, in
the advisory opinion to which reference has been made, did not
consider this view "to be sound in principle."
In a more recent development, the Court has in a number of instances according near-finality to administrative interpretation of
federal statutes, by tradition a "law" question. The test here is
that of rational basis; the administrative conclusion as to statutory
meaning stands, provided there is a rational basis for it.9' While
of great significance, this development should not be as surprising,
nor as difficult to explain, as many have taken it to be. The Court's
early tolerance of contingency delegation of legislative power,
which is the analogue of the substantial evidence test in delegations
of power traditionally exercised by courts, has long since been
followed by Court approbation of delegation of broad rule-making
power, i.e., the power of administrative bodies to promulgate law
within the bounds of generalized declarations of Congressional
policy. The law-fact distinction having disintegrated in judicial
89
DAVis,
90

ADMINTsArnVE LAw TEXT § 2.12 (1959).
Id. at § § 29.01, 29.11.
9, This development is considered by Professor Davis, id. chap. 30, who
finds in the cases both inconsistency and lack of satisfactory explanation for
this inconsistency.
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control of delegations of legislative power, is its threatened disappearance so surprising with respect to judicial review of administrative adjudication on "law" questions as well as "fact"
questions?92
If in this development there is any basis for surprise, it lies in
the Court's failure to invoke constitutional judicial review to
insist, in accordance with the separation of powers principle of the
Constitution, upon its right to a more authoritative participation in
law determinations, which, together with the resolution of fact
issues, constitutes the essence of ordinary judicial review. But
here again, the likely explanation for this attitude of the Court
lies in a combination of the Court's respect for federal administrative bodies and the flexibility which remains to it in applying the
rational basis test to administrative determinations of law questions.9"
When, however, there was pressed upon the Supreme Court of
the United States the proposition that it should in effect further
yield its function of constitutional judicial review by according
essential finality to administrative fact determinations decisive
of constitutional issues of federalism or private right, the Court
balked in a celebrated series of decisions beginning with Ohio
Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough94 and Ng Fung Ho v.
9 and St.
White,9 and continuing through Crowell v. Bensoen
Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States." Although these cases
are well known by name, a full understanding of them requires
close analysis of each.
Ben Avon, the earliest of these decisions, involved the value to be
placed on a water utility for purposes of rate regulation. Dissatisfied with the value set by the Public Service Commission of
92

Convinced that administrative agencies are best equipped to make

all types of fact determinations, Dean Landis in his study of the administrative process faced the question whether, if the issue is one of determining
who can best perform a particular task, traditional law questions ought not
also be determined by the administrative. Resolution of the question led
him into a stimulating consideration of the concept of the rule of law
and of the role which courts should play. LANDis, ThE A mnmTAnVE

PnocEss, 140-155 (1938).

93 DAvIs, op. cit. supra note 89, at § 30.08.

94 253 U.S. 287 (1920).

95259 U.S. 276 1922).
96285 U.S. 22 (1932).
97 298 U.S. 38 (1936).
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Pennsylvania, the company appealed to the Pennsylvania courts.
In the Superior Court it was successful; that court "reviewed the
certified record," appraised the company's property at a substantially higher figure, and remanded. But on further appeal by
the Commission, the supreme court of Pennsylvania reinstated
the administrative order. Asserting that as to those items "wherein
the Superior Court differed from the commission upon the question
of values, there was merely the substitution of the former's judgment for that of the commission," the State supreme court declared that the lower court should not have interfered "as there
was competent evidence tending to sustain the Commission's conclusion and no abuse of discretion appeared."98 In turn, the
supreme court of Pennsylvania was reversed by the Supreme Court
of the United States. The essence of the majority position is contained in the following paragraph: 99
The order here involved prescribed a complete schedule
of maximum rates and was legislative in character. [Citations omitted]. In all such cases, if the owner claims confiscation of his property will result, the State must provide
a fair opportunity for submitting that issue to a judicial
tribunal for determination upon its own independent
judgment as to both law and facts; otherwise the order
is void because in conflict with the due process clause,
Fourteenth Amendment. [Citations omitted].
Joined by Justices Holmes and Clarke, Mr. Justice Brandeis
dissented. With the essentials of procedural due process satisfied
and substantial evidence to support the Commission's findings,
he was of the view that "the judgment of the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania must be affirmed, unless, as contended, the claim
of confiscation compels this court to decide, upon the weight of the
evidence, whether or not its property has been undervalued or
unless some error of law is shown." ' The Justice could find no
such compulsion in the allegation of confiscation.
On writ of error to a state court . .. we accept facts as
there found, whether in law or equity and although the
98
253 U.S. at 288.
99

Id. at 289.

,0 0 Id. at 297.
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existence of the federal question depends upon the determination of the issue of fact, and although the finding
of fact will determine whether or not there has been a
taking of property in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. [Citations omitted]."'
To Mr. Justice Brandeis was assigned the writing of the Court's
opinion, two years later, in Ng Fung Ho v. White. With respect
to four persons of the Chinese race, the lower federal courts had
sustained, as against test by habeas corpus, deportation proceedings
ordered as a consequence of administrative hearings on warrants
of deportation asserting presence in the United States in violation
of the Chinese Exclusion Act. The Supreme Court affirmed in the
cases of two as to whom there was no claim of United States
citizenship. "Congress has power to order at any time the deportation of aliens whose presence in the country it deems hurtful; and
may do so by appropriate executive proceedings." The judicial task
here "is merely to ascertain the intention of Congress.' ' " But the
other two, claiming United States citizenship, gained reversal.
With no reference to Ben Avon, Mr. Justice Brandeis thus explained the difference in result:' 3
Jurisdiction in the executive to order deportation exists
only if the person arrested is an alien. The claim of citizenship is thus a denial of an essential jurisdictional fact ....
To deport one who so claims to be a citizen, obviously
deprives him of liberty, as was pointed out in Chin Yow
v. United States . . . It may result also in loss of both
property and life; or of all that makes life worth living.
Against the danger of such deprivation without the
sanction afforded by judicial proceedings, the Fifth
Amendment affords protection in its guarantee of due
process of law. The difference in security of judicial over
administrative action has been adverted to by this court.
After a ten-year interval, and some change in Court membership,
the issue returned to the Court. The opinions in each of the two
cases of the 1930's are considerably longer, suggesting greater
101
102

Id. at 298.

259 U.S. at 280.
284-285.

'0 3 Id. at
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effort on the part of each view to firm up its position. Careful
analysis of the opinions must perforce be longer. For the majority
in Crowell v. Benson, Mr. Chief Justice Hughes opens by observing
that the Federal Act under challenge, the Longshoremen's and
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, "has two limitations that are
fundamental. It deals exclusively with compensation in respect
of disability or death resulting 'from an injury occurring upon the
navigable waters of the United States' if recovery 'through workmen's compensation proceedings may not validly be provided by
State law', and it applies only when the relation of master and
servant exists."' °4 Later in his opinion the Chief Justice makes
it clear that these limitations are fundamental in the constitutional,
as well as the statutory, sense. "These conditions are indispensable
to the application of the statute, not only because the Congress
has so provided explicitly (§ 3), but also because the power of the
Congress to enact the legislation turns upon the existence of these
conditions.""0 5 Apart from instances "involving constitutional
rights," said the Chief Justice, "there can be no doubt that the Act
contemplates that, as to questions of fact arising with respect to
injuries to employees within the purview of the Act, the findings
of the deputy commissioner, supported by evidence and within
the scope of his authority, shall be final." 6
This is so as to both the challenge under due process and that
under article III. The former contention is disposed of in two
paragraphs, the gist of which is contained in the following sentence: "The use of the administrative method for these purposes,
assuming due notice, proper opportunity to be heard, and that
findings are based upon evidence, falls easily within the principle
of the decisions sustaining similar procedure against objections
under the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments."'" ' Passing to the contention under article III, Chief Justice
Hughes, noting that the issue concerns only determinations of fact,
comments upon the "at once apparent" distinction "between cases
of private right and those which arise between the Government
and persons subject to its authority in connection with the performance of the constitutional functions of the executive or legisla104

285 U.S. at 37-38.

,05 Id. at 55.
0
6

1 Id. at 46.
,0 7 Id.at 47.
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tive departments."' °8 Reference is then made to the recognition of
this distinction in Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., one of the cases discussed in the first lecture.'0 9 Admittedly, the Chief Justice observes, the present case "is one of
private right, that is, of the liability of one individual to another
under the law as defined. But in cases of this sort, there is no
requirement that, in order to maintain the essential attributes of
the judicial power, all determinations of fact in constitutional
courts shall be made by judges." ' 0 He instances the use of juries
at common law, the ancient employment of juries in admiralty,
and the 'historic practice" in both admiralty and equity of calling
"to the assistance of the courts, without the consent of the parties,
masters and commissioners or assessors" whose findings were not
disturbed, as a matter of practice, when supported by evidence
and uninfected by errors of law. Summing up, Chief Justice
Hughes declared that'
For the purposes stated, we are unable to find any constitutional obstacle to the action of Congress in availing
itself of a method shown by experience to be essential
in order to apply its standards to the thousands of cases
involved, thus relieving the courts of a most serious
burden while preserving their complete authority to insure
the proper application of the law.
Clearly, the Court is here saying, consistent with what we have
already found as to the position of the Supreme Court of the
United States, that the doctrine of separation-of-powers does not
prevent transference to federal administrative bodies of nearfinality in the ordinary type of fact determination. Stated otherwise, the Court is willing to yield to the administrative process as
regards its historic exercise of ordinary judicial review, retaining
only a minimal reviewing power.
But, the Chief Justice immediately asserts, "A different question
is presented where the determinations of fact are fundamental or
'jurisdictional,'" meaning, as we have already seen, fact determinations controlling of constitutional limitations. Here, those limita10 8 Id. at 50.
109 18 How. 272 (1855), discussed supra at pages 125-126.
110285 U.S. at 51.

M'Id. at 54.
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tions are two: the federalistic one of Congressional power vis-a-vis
the States and the due process prohibition on both the States and
the Congress as concerns imposition of liability without fault "regardless of particular circumstances or relations."'1 2 Then follows
the climactic paragraph of the opinion:.. 3
In relation to these basic facts, the question is not the
ordinary one as to the propriety of provision for administrative determinations. Nor have we simply the
question of due process in relation to notice and hearing.
It is rather a question of the appropriate maintenance of
the Federal judicial power in requiring the observance of
constitutional restrictions. It is the question whether the
Congress may substitute for constitutional courts, in which
the judicial power of the United States is vested, an administrative agency - in this instance a single deputy
commissioner - for the final determination of the existence
of the facts upon which the enforcement of the constitutional rights of the citizen depend. The recognition of
the utility and convenience of administrative agencies for
the investigation and finding of facts within their proper
province, and the support of their authorized action, does
not require the conclusion that there is no limitation of
their use, and that Congress could completely oust the
courts of all determinations of fact by vesting the authority
to make them with finality in its own instruments or in
the Executive Department. That would be to sap the
judicial power as it exists under the Federal Constitution,
and to establish a government of a bureaucratic character
alien to our system, wherever fundamental rights depend, as not infrequently they do depend, upon the facts,
and finality as to facts becomes in effect finality in law.
Dissenting, Mr. Justice Brandeis, with whom Justices Stone and
Roberts joined, made much of the fact that the majority, in
affirming the district court, permitted a trial de novo on the issue
of employment. In so doing the Court had clearly gone beyond
Ben Avofs requirement of an independent judgment of the courts
on facts decisive of constitutionality. The essence of the Brandeisian
112

The federalistic limitation is spelled out id. at 55; the other id. at 56.
at 56-57.

113 Id.
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opinion is to be found in Parts Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth. Careful attention to the following passages will disclose the thrust of the
dissent.
Fourth. Trial de novo of the issue of the existence of
the employer-employee relation is not required by the due
process clause. That clause ordinarily does not even
require that parties shall be permitted to have a judicial
tribunal pass upon the weight of the evidence introduced
before the administrative board. See Dahistrom Metallic
Door Co. v. Industrial Board, 284 U.S. 594. The findings
of fact of the deputy commissioner, the Court now decides,
are conclusive as to most issues, if supported by evidence.
Yet as to the issue of employment the Court holds not
only that such findings may not be declared final, but
that it would create a serious constitutional doubt to
construe the Act as committing to the deputy commissioner
the simple function of collecting the evidence upon which
the court will ultimately decide the issue.
It is suggested that this exception is required as to issues
of fact involving claims of constitutional right. For reasons which I shall later discuss, I cannot believe that the
issue of employment is one of constitutional right. But even
assuming it to be so, the conclusion does not follow that
the trial of the issue must therefore be upon a record made
in the district court. That the function of collecting
evidence may be committed to an administrative tribunal
is settled by a host of cases, and supported by persuasive
analogies, none of which justify a distinction between
issues of constitutional right and any others. Resort to
administrative remedies may be made a condition precedent to a judicial hearing. [Citations omitted]. This is so
of rights
even though a party is asserting deprivation
1 4
secured by the Federal Constitution ....
Fifth. Trial de novo of the existence of the employeremployee relation is not required by the Judiciary Article
of the Constitution ....

The argument is that existence

of the relation of employer and employee is, as a matter of
114

Id. at 77-78.
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substantive law, indispensable to the application of the
statute, because the power of Congress to enact the legislation turns upon its existence; and that whenever the
question of constitutional power depends upon an issue of
fact that issue must, as a matter of procedure, be determinable independently upon evidence freshly introduced
in a court. Neither proposition seems to me well founded.
Whether the power of Congress to provide compensation for injuries occurring on navigable waters is limited to
cases in which the employer-employee relation exists has
not heretofore been passed upon by this Court and was
not argued in this case. I see no justification for assuming,
under those circumstances, that it is so limited. Without
doubt the word "employee" was used in the Longshoremen's Act in the sense in which the common law defines it.
But that definition is not immutable; and no provision of
the Constitution confines the application of liability without fault to instances where the relation of employment,
1,S
as so defined, exists ....
Sixth. Even if the constitutional power of Congress to provide compensation is limited to cases in which the employer-employee relation exists, I see no basis for a contention that the denial of the right to a trial de novo upon the
issue of employment is in any manner subversive of the
independence of the federal judicial power. Nothing in
the Constitution, or in any prior decision of this Court to
which attention has been called, lends support to the
doctrine that a judicial finding of any fact involved in any
civil proceeding to enforce a pecuniary liability may not
be made upon evidence introduced before a properly constituted administrative tribunal, or that a determination
so made may not be deemed an independent judicial
determination. Congress has repeatedly exercised authority to confer upon tribunals which it creates, be they
administrative bodies or courts of limited jurisdiction,
the power to receive evidence concerning the facts upon
which the exercise of federal power must be predicated,
and to determine whether those facts exist. The power of
I 5 Id. at 80, 81-82.
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Congress to provide by legislation for liability under certain circumstances subsumes the power to provide for the
determination of the existence of those circumstances. It
does not depend upon the absolute existence in reality
of any fact.'"6
St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States was a suit to restrain
enforcement of an order of the United States Secretary of Agriculture fixing maximum rates for the company's services. The suit
was first heard by a three-judge federal district court, which, upon
the record made before the Secretary, dismissed the bill as against
the company's assertion of confiscation violative of the Fifth
Amendment. Puzzled by decisions of the Supreme Court on the extent of judicial review required in cases of this kind, the district
court put the question directly: 7
If in a judicial review of an order of the Secretary his
findings supported by substantial evidence are conclusive
upon the reviewing court in every case where a constitutional issue is not involved, why are they not conclusive
when a constitutional issue is involved?
For itself, the lower court was of the view that the substantial
evidence test was applicable notwithstanding the presence of an
issue of confiscation. Nevertheless, it took the precaution of
weighing the evidence and making many findings of its own.
This prudent action on the part of the federal district court
averted reversal, but not an explanatory lecture, by the Supreme
Court. Again the mouthpiece of the majority, Chief Justice Hughes
patiently explained the difference which had eluded the lower
court:"'
In determining the scope of judicial review of [a legislative act such as the fixing of rates], there is a distinction
between action within the sphere of legislative authority
and action which transcends the limits of legislative power.

6

11

Id. at 84-85.

St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 11 F. Supp, 322, 327
(D. C. W. D. Mo. 1935).
118 298 U.S. at 50-51, 51-52.
"17

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1967

17

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 69, Iss. 3 [1967], Art. 3

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69

Exercising its rate-making authority, the legislature has
a broad discretion. It may exercise that authority directly,
or through the agency it creates or appoints to act for that
purpose in accordance with appropriate standards. The
court does not sit as a board of revision to substitute its
judgment for that of the legislature or its agents as to
matters within the province of either ....

But the Constitution fixes limits to the rate-making
power by prohibiting the deprivation of property without
due process of law or the taking of private property for
public use without just compensation. When the legislature acts directly, its action is subject to judicial scrutiny
and determination in order to prevent the transgression of
these limits of power ....

Legislative declaration or find-

ings is necessarily subject to independent judicial review
upon the facts and the law by courts of competent jurisdiction to the end that the Constitution as the supreme
law of the land may be maintained. Nor can the legislature escape the constitutional limitation by authorizing its
agent to make findings that the agent has kept within that
limitation.
In a clear reference to the position taken in these cases by Mr.
Justice Brandeis, the Chief Justice then comments: 1 9
It is said that we can retain judicial authority to examine
the weight of evidence when the question concerns the
right of personal liberty. But if this be so, it is not because
we are privileged to perform our judicial duty in that
case and for reasons of convenience to disregard it in
others. The principle applies when rights either of person or of property are protected by constitutional restrictions. Under our system there is no warrant for the view
that the judicial power of a competent court can be circumscribed by any legislative arrangement designed to
give effect to administrative action going beyond the
limits of constitutional authority.
In closing the explanatory lecture, Chief Justice Hughes does
mitigate to some extent the stringency of the majority position:12 °
191d. at 52.
120 Id. at 53.
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But this judicial duty to exercise an independent judgment does not require or justify disregard of the weight
which may properly attach to findings upon hearing and
evidence. On the contrary, the judicial duty is performed
in the light of the proceedings already had and may be
greatly facilitated by the assembling and analysis of the
facts in the course of the legislative determination. Judicial judgment may be none the less appropriately independent because informed and aided by the sifting procedure of an expert legislative agency.
Because the majority affirms, rather than reverses, the lower
court, Mr. Justice Brandeis finds himself in concurrence and not
in dissent. Yet his grounds for affirmance differ:' '
Like the lower court, I think no good reason exists for
making special exception of issues of fact bearing upon a
constitutional right. The inexorable safeguard which the
due process clause assures is not that a court may examine
whether the findings as to value or income are correct, but
that the trier of the facts shall be an impartial tribunal;
that no finding shall be made except upon due notice and
opportunity to be heard; that the procedure at the hearing
shall be consistent with the essentials of a fair trial; and
that it shall be conducted in such a way that there will
be opportunity for a court to determine whether the applicable rules of law and procedure were observed.
But from a later portion of his concurrence we learn that this
restriction of the due process concept to procedural-type rights is
not always operative. Relying upon a host of earlier decisions of
the Court, Mr. Justice Brandeis notes that "they draw distinctions
which give clear indiction when due process requires judicial
process and when it does not."
The first distinction is between issues of law and issues
of fact ....The second distinction is between the right
to liberty of person and other constitutional rights. A
citizen who claims his liberty is being infringed is entitled,
upon habeas corpus, to the opportunity of a judicial deter121

Id. at 73.
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mination of the facts. And so highly is this liberty prized,
that the opportunity must be accorded to any resident of
the United States who claims to be a citizen. Compare
Ng Fung Ho v. White . . . with United States v. Ju
Toy ...

and Tang Tun v. Edsell ...

But a multitude of

decisions tells us that when dealing with property a
much more liberal rule applies. They show that due
process of law does not always entitle an owner to have
the correctness of findings of fact reviewed by a
court . . .' 2 2

From careful analysis of Ben Avon, Fung Ho, Crowell and St.
loseph, against a background of full understanding of the admittedly complicated constitutional structure of this country, the
following propositions become clear:
First, in none of the four cases was the decisive holding
bottomed on the doctrine of separation-of-powers. The one clear
involvement of this doctrine appears in the first portion of the
Court's opinion in Crowell v. Benson, where a liberal position is
taken with respect to the transference to federal administrative
bodies of near-finality in non-constitutional fact situations. Misunderstood has been the Chief Justice's later assertion that the
two issues involving constitutional fact determinations present "a
question of the appropriate maintenance of the Federal judicial
power in requiring the observance of constitutional restrictions."
It must be conceded that in the early portion of the paragraph
which follows this climactic one, the Court is talking the language
of separation of powers in urging "the irrelevancy of State statutes
and citations from State courts as to the distribution of State
powers . . . " because a "State may distribute its powers as it sees
fit. .. ""' But the Chief Justice may be forgiven this lapse into

Montesquieu-like language, which not uncommonly, although
erroneously, is employed to explain and justify the exercise of
constitutional judicial review. As sensed by a major commentator
who made much of this passage,"' its significance is largely
vitiated by the Court's proviso to the effect that a State's freedom
Id. at 77.
123 285 U.S. at 57.
122

124 Dickinson, Crowell v. Benson: Judicial Review of Administrative Determination of Questions of "Constitutional Fact", 80 U. of PA. L. I v. 1055,
at 1080 (1932).
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with respect to power distribution is subject to "those restrictions
of the Federal Constitution [including due process] which are
applicable to State authority."' 25
In the total context of the Hughesian analysis, the reference to
article III is not to any separation-of-powers requirement; rather,
it is to the Court's assertion that under that article, despite the lack
of clarity of the authority, it has power to engage in constitutional
judicial review, here of a federal statute challenged as beyond
Congressional bounds, both federalistically and substantively. The
confusion is directly traceable to the admitted fact that, while
article III looks to ordinary judicial review, it is at best unclear
as to judicial exercise of constitutional judicial review. And, while
it is correct to say, with Professor Davis, that "The Ben Avon case
has usually been interpreted as a bit of separation-of-powers conceptualism," 2 ' this common interpretation misses the point because it fails to make the distinction, labored in the first Lecture,
between indirect and direct constitutional limitations. It is because in the context of Ben Avon substantive due process imposes
a stricter standard than does separation-of-powers that the majority
insisted that "the State must provide a fair opportunity for submitting that issue [i.e., the issue of confiscation] to a judicial tribunal for determination upon its own independent judgment as
to both law and facts."' 2 Conceptualism there is, but it is justifiable
conceptualism in a constitutional system employing both direct and
indirect limitations on governmental power.
Second, in all four cases the Court was concerned with the
protection of constitutional right. In Crowell, two different constitutional rights were involved; in each of the other three, a
single right. All of the four involved varying contentions grounded
in due process-one of liberty and three of property. Only in
Crowell was there also a constitutional contention based upon
the federalistic division of power between Nation and States. Otherwise stated, the claims of constitutional right sprung largely from
direct limitations on the power of Congress and the States. "All
of the cases deal with a claim that a constitutional limit has been
transgressed, and they reduce to the premise that the judicial func125 285 U.S. at 57.
1264 DAvis, A
mNmSTATrW LAW TREATISE § 29.09, at 165
127The full quotation appears supra at page 258.
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tion vested in the courts by article III encompasses a power-

perhaps a duty-to determine de novo the relevant facts in all

cases involving constitutional limits."'2 8 To Professor Jaffe is to

be attributed not only this insight but also much further understanding of the admittedly confusing interrelationship between the

terms "jurisdictional fact" and "constitutional fact." Professor Davis
finds wearisome and uninformative Professor Jaffe's analysis of
"Jurisdictional Fact at Common Law" as background for better
evaluation of the "constitutional fact" doctrine.'29 Yet there is value
in it because it lays the basis for a realization that the confusion is
that of failing to make the distinction between ordinary judicial
review and constitutionaljudicial review. For Professor Jaffe makes
it clear that the doctrine of jurisdictional fact was the key device
by which, from Dr. Bonham's Case on, English and American
courts evolved the common-law system of judicial review "with
respect to questions of statutory power." Mr. Justice Brandeis was as

guilty as was Chief Justice Hughes in using the term "jurisdictional
fact," historically shorthand for an aspect of ordinary judicial review, to refer to the functionally distinct use of judicial power in
the United States to exercise constitutional judicial review, which

necessarily gives significance to "constitutional fact."' 30 The two
concepts coalesce in meaning only where a legislature has exercised
its power to the utmost constitutional limit. Both Hughes in

28
1 Jaffe, Judicial Review: Constitutional and Jurisdictional Fact, 70
H v. L. RBv. 953, at 975 (1957). This article has been reprinted as chap.
16 of JA'z, JuDic AL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION (1965).
129 Davis, "Judicial Control of Administrative Action: A Review", 66
Col. L. REv. 635, at 676 (1966). The Jaffe analysis originally appeared at
953-967 of 70 HIAv. L. REv., cited supra note 128.
130 Holmes had seen the distinction in the much debated case of Miller
v. Horton, 152 Mass. 540, 26 N.E. 100 (1891). Damages were there sought
by the owner of a horse for its destruction by the commissioners of contagious
diseases, who had acted in the belief the horse had the glanders. Writing
the opinion of the supreme judicial court of the Commonwealth, Judge
Holmes interpreted the controlling statute literally, to limit the authority of
the commissioners to instances where the animal did "in fact" have the glanders. He then asserted that the owner was entitled to a subsequent judicial
trial even on the assumption that the Massachusetts legislature could have
drawn the statute more broadly, to authorize destruction as well where the
horse did not, as where it did, have the disease. Thus he recognized the
power of the court to exercise ordinary judicial review, although of course
he did not use this term. But, continuing, Holmes declared the court unable
to "admit that the legislature has an unlimited right to destroy property
without compensation, on the ground that destruction is not an appropriaCertainly the
tion to public use" within the Massachusetts constitution ....
legislature could not declare all cattle to be nuisances and order them to
be killed without compensation." 152 Mass. at 547, 26 N. E. at 102.
Here, clearly, Holmes recognized the power of constitutional judicial review.
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Crowell and Brandeis in Fung Ho assumed Congressional exercise
of power to this degree; hence there was some justification for
their descriptions of the issues before the Court as ones of jurisdictional-constitutional fact. Nevertheless, clear analysis requires
abandonment of the term "jurisdictional
fact" in the context of the
1 31
four cases under examination.
Third, it is neither inconsistent nor surprising to find the Court
unwilling to surrender to administrative bodies an essential ingredient of its power to exercise constitutionaljudicial review. Bowing to the necessities of modem governmental administration,
it early and ungrudgingly yielded its authority to continue in the
Federal administrative area the historic judicial practice of ordinary
judicial review. Further concession would seem to be expected only
of vigorous opponents of constitutional judicial review. Mr. Justice
Brandeis was certainly unwilling to surrender the Court's power
of constitutional judicial review where personal liberty was involved because of the greater "security of judicial over administrative action." That he was willing to do so, where federalistic or
property values were concerned, provides us with our cue. There
is some objection per se to constitutional judicial review of direct
constitutional limitations. Yet much of today's opposition to this
form of judicial review is largely selective, dependent upon the nature of the values seeking judicial protection. The easy dichotomy
between property values and those of personal, civil and political
liberty, if not self-satisfactory, can be buttressed by the view that the
distinction is necessary to the reconciliation of constitutional judicial
review with democracy. 3 2 There is no question but that, while Brandeis lost the battle of the four cases, he won the day in the law re' and with Professor Davis. 3"
views, both at the time and since, 33
Fung Ho is fine, say the commentators, and it is a happy fact that
131 The position taken here is at odds with the textual analysis of the Big
Four Cases made by GELLoRN AN BYsE, ADmrInmTRArvE LAW: CASES AND
CoNaiNrrs 472-492 (4th ed. 1960). Despite the fact that their view has
been the one generally accepted, the writer respectfully questions its soundness.
132 Rostow, supra note 23, effects reconciliation by reliance upon this
distinction.
133 DAvis, op. cit. supra note 126, cites to much of the periodical literature in § § 29.08, note 23; 29.09, note 4. There have been some commentators who have swum against the current. One such is Weil, Administrative
Finality, 38 HAzy. L. REv. 447 (1925); see also Keefe, Administrative RuleMaking
L. Rxv. 303, 320-323 (1939).
13 4 and the Courts, 8 FoRDHAm
Davis, supra note 1; DAvis, op. cit. supra note 89, §§ 29.08, 29.09;
4 DAvis, op. cit. supra note 126, §§ 29.08, 29.09.
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its authority survives; the other three decisions, primarily Ben Avon
and Crowell, are quite unacceptable, and they are "going, going,
almost gone" '35 in hope if not in fact.
Whether Crowell and Ben Avon are in fact about gone, as
their numerous critics so devoutly hope, must await another day's
analysis. For now, it will have to suffice to complete analysis of
the four celebrated cases by considering the subsidiary, yet important, question as to the extent to which the Court should review beyond the substantial evidence test where constitutional
facts are at issue. The choice made by the majority in each of the
cases under consideration is that between independent judgment
on the facts and trial de novo. Fung Ho and Crowell called for
trial de novo; Ben Avon and St. Joseph viewed the function of
constitutional judicial review as satisfied by judicial exercise of
an independent judgment on the facts as contained in the administrative record. In his Crowell dissent, Mr. Justice Brandeis
made no effort whatsoever to reconcile his rejection of trial de
novo in that situation after requiring it in Fung Ho. The explanation cannot lie in the absence of an administrative record in
the earlier case; in the first paragraph of his opinion for the unanimous Court he states that "The case was heard upon the original
files of the Bureau of Immigration containing the record of the
deportation proceedings." '3 6 The reason must lie in his expressed
feeling of insecurity regarding the then administrative process in
deportation, a feeling he did not have when it came to administration of federal workmen's compensation.
But how explain the majority's requirement of trial de novo in
Crowell? Chief Justice Hughes, in a closing paragraph, points to
the wording of the statute as the explanation: 3 "
There is no provision of the statute which seeks to
confine the court in such a case to the record before the
deputy commissioner or to the evidence which he has
taken. The remedy which the statute makes available is
not by an appeal or by a writ of certiorari for review of
his determination upon the record before him. The
3

' - Davis, supra note 129.
136
137

259 U.S. at 278.
285 U.S. at 63-64.
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remedy is "through injunction proceedings, mandatory or
otherwise." § 21(b) ....By providing for injunction proceedings, the Congress evidently contemplated a suit as
in equity, and in such a suit the complainant would have
full opportunity to plead and prove either that the injury did not occur upon the naviagable waters of the
United States or that the relation of master and servant
did not exist, and hence that the case lay outside the purview of the statute.
Mr. Justice Brandeis is quite convincing in his counter-argument that "the decree should be reversed, because Congress did
not authorize a trial de novo." From this he passed, as revealed in
the paragraphs of his dissent earlier quoted, to his contention
that the Constitution, no more than the Congress, required trial
de novo. But perhaps it is he who provides a clue to an inarticulate major premise of the majority when he observes that'38
The lower federal courts, except in the case at bar
[italics added] have uniformly construed the Act as denying a trial de novo of any issue determined by the deputy
commissioner; have held that, in respect to those issues,
the review afforded must be upon the record made before
the deputy commissioner; and that the deputy commissioner's findings of fact must be accepted as conclusive if
supported by evidence, unless there was some irregularity
in the proceeding before him.
Examination of the opinion of the federal district court discloses
that the trial judge was of opinion that the teachings of both
Murray's Lessee and Ben Avon required him to hold a hearing de
novo to pass upon the merits of Benson's claims, rather than to
limit himself "to the question whether or not the commissioner
on the evidence before him could have found liability."' 39 But
why the necessity of choice between the most extreme views; in
light of Ben Avon, why did he believe trial de novo to be constitutionally necessary, rather than an independent judgment on
the constitutionally relevant facts? In affirming, the Circuit Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found support in Murray's Lessee
13 8 Id. at 68.
139 Benson v. Crowell, 33 F. 2d 137, 141 (S. D. Ala., 1929).
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and Ben Avon, and Fung Ho as well, for the trial court's view that
the Constitution required that he go beyond the evidence adduced at the administrative hearing.'4 ° But in closing its opinion
the intermediate federal court declared that the instant case would
present "an anomalous situation" were the court to be "restricted
to a consideration of only the evidence which the Deputy Commissioner had before him . . ." The anomaly is thus described: 41
Though in the hearing before him there was testimony
tending to prove facts from which the existence of [the
employment] relationship arose, it was not made to appear
that the Deputy Commissioner in reaching his legal conclusion had in mind such facts, or that he was influenced
by that evidence or accorded it any probative value. There
was nothing before the court to negative the inference
that the stated legal conclusion of the Deputy Commissioner was based entirely upon what he or some other
person saw or heard in an investigation or inquiry other
than the hearing in which was adduced evidence which
was brought before the court. What was seen or heard
in such other investigation or inquiry was not made known
to the court in any way. The record does not show that
the Deputy Commissioner found any fact or state of facts
having any bearing on the question of the existence vel
non of the relation of employer and employee between
the appellee and the claimant. It does not show that evidence produced in the hearing before the Deputy Commissioner supported any conclusion of fact reached by
him with reference to any relation between the claimant
and the appellee.
This contention, that in this case the Deputy Commissioner
violated the basic requirement of administrative law that all evidence be of record, was repeated in respondent's argument in
the Supreme Court, again as a sort of flying buttress to the constitutional contention based upon the demands of due process." 2
If true, there could not be an adequate constitutional judicial review on the administrative record and there would perforce be
Crowell v. Benson, 45 F. 2d 66, 69 (C.C.A. 5th, 1930).
Id. at 70.
142 285 U.S. at 34.

140
141
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need for trial de novo. If this be the inarticulate reasoning of
the Court, we have as a basis for explaining Crowers requirement
of trial de novo a reason akin to that which Brandeis advanced
for the Court in Fung Ho; by the same token, we have a predicate
for bringing into reconciliation, as regards the extent of deviation
from the substantial evidence test applicable to facts not decisive
of constitutionality, all four of the decisions we have been considering. For in both Ben Avon and St. Joseph there seems to be
no doubt as to the adequacy of the administrative record; in such
instances, constitutional judicial review can be satisfactorily effectuated by independent judicial judgment on the facts as found
by the administrative body.
Not only do we have a basis for reconciliation, but the basis
is sound. It avoids the artificial and impracticable distinction attempted between constitutional fact and constitutional claim, by
which one commentator manfully sought to restrict the supposed
impact of Crowelrs call for trial de novo by treating it as a right
discretionary with the Court rather than mandated by the Constitution."' It renders functus officio the far more common commentator conclusion that we are here faced with unruly judicial
concepts of unpredictable and unjustified application. Affirmatively, this basis for reconciliation limits trial de novo to those infrequent situations where either the administrative record is inadequate, the administrative procedure faulty, or the administrative
agency untrustworthy. In the normal run of situations, constitutional judicial review will be limited to an independent court
evaluation of the facts administratively found. And even here
Chief Justice Hughes assures, it will be recalled from the oftquoted passage of St. Joseph,"' that "this judicial duty of independent judgment does not require or justify disregard of the
weight which may properly attach to findings upon hearing and
evidence." Thus is preserved the meaningfulness of both the administrative process and the constitutional-judicial process. Only
where the administrative process fails to live up to quality standards normally achieved by it must the courts take over the burden
of ascertaining the facts decisive of substantive constitutional
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claims, primarily those arising from direct constitutional limitations
on governmental power. 4 '

145 While Professor Davis would apply the substantial evidence test to
constitutional facts, he has urged that pragmatic considerations, including the
relative capacity of administrators and judges in specific situations, govern
decision as to the extent of judicial review over administrative action, rather
than traditional conceptualism. Davis To What Extent Should the Decisions
of Administrative Bodies be Reviewable by the Courts?, 25 A. B. A. J. 770
(1939). To similar effect is Tollefson, Administrative Finality, 29 MxcH. L.
REv. 839 (1931). Compare Professor Davis's disagreement with Professor
Jaffe as to whether administrators or judges are the better experts "on problems of procedural fairness." Davis, supra note 129, at 673.
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